A Troubled Bluefin Tuna in North Africa
The stocks of bluefin tuna along the southern shores of the Mediterranean coast are quickly depleting. This is also the case in the entire Mediterranean Sea, not just the souther rim. Over fishing and capture practices that some qualify as savage hunting are all leading to the fast disappearance of tuna stocks in the region. Of a particular worry is the aggressive stance of industrial fishing fleets that do not hesitate to seek and capture tuna even in the reproductive zone of the Gulf of Syrte, offshore Libya. Because of the profitable nature of this activity, fraud and lack of transparency are paramount, while the canning industry in the region is facing its own troubles.
This sorry state of the Mediterranean tuna, with its sad environmental impact has been decried for years by NGOs and environmental watchers such as the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) and Greenpeace. Scientists from organizations such as the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) have also included their voices in the global concern over the fate of tuna in the region. Dominated by the United States and Japan, which have sided with their own industrial fishing companies, no efficient action has been taken by ICCAT to protect what is left. Yet even large consuming countries like the United States recognize the problem. So much so that in November 2007, the United States requested the banning for three years of bluefin tuna fishing in the Mediterranean during the ICCAT’s annual session held in Antalya, Turkey. The goal was to stop the deadly practices of the efficiently designed trawlers and fleets from Japan, Korea, Italy, France, Spain and other countries. Acting as a watchdog without real authority or enforcement capability, ICCAT authorizes an annual catch of 32,000 tons of tuna in the Mediterranean, distributing the catches in quotas among the countries surrounding the Mediterranean Sea. But the reality is that the modern sea hunters capture nearly twice that amount. Some sort of country reporting and fleet licensing is used to triangulate the results in terms of volumes caught. But the reality is far from that.
IN ALGERIA: AN ACTIVITY EVOLVING UNDER THE RADAR SCREEN
Since 2002 Algeria’s bluefin tuna quota was set to 1,500 tons per year. This is the maximum Algeria can claim. Most of that quantity (60%) is presumably captured by the domestic fleet and 40% by licensed foreign trawlers who pay a fee of DZD 500,000 per ship and DZD 150,000 per ton of tuna captured. Domestic trawlers are exempted from paying these fees. However, Algerian observers, the general population and the media have been raising questions about the destination of that annual catch. They argue that consumers domestically rarely see fresh tuna in the markets. They also say that there are no processing or canning plants in the country to absorb that volume. Independent investigators and newspaper reporters concluded that no single pound of fresh tuna earmarked to Algeria is sold domestically. Of the 1,500 tons provided to Algeria, up to 600 tons are sold to Japanese or Korean buyers. That represents MAD 120 million captured by the Algerian treasury. The remaining volume of 1,000 tons is simply untraceable, most likely handled by underground networks of traffickers. Fisheries ministry officials say that that amount is essentially captured by small fishing units, called artisan fishermen. But their association has issued an immediate denial, insisting that its members have never captured a single tuna fish, let alone exporting it. The customs service confirmed the lack of export activity in that area. The association says for the ministry to qualify its tuna fishermen as a professional fishing fleet is a wrong statement of facts. It argues that the so-called tuna fishing fleet is composed of a half dozen old trawlers and sardine boats reconverted into tuna catching boats that have been poorly performing and in constant need for repair. This is in sharp contrast to the ships coming from Japan and Korea. With 12 highly efficient ships officially licensed by the Algerian authorities, the Asian fleet active in Algerian waters claims an annual catch of 600 tons. It is therefore, unconceivable that the Algerian fishermen, with their under-performing boats could do more than their Asian peers.
In March 2008, the fisheries ministry convened a meeting of some two dozen trawler owners who are licensed to fish tuna. The meeting was meant to invite them to share the Algerian fishing quota but they insisted that they were under equipped and unable to face the technological capabilities of foreign fleets. Indeed, they are at a competitive disadvantage but that’s not necessarily good news for the fish. Bluefin tuna in the Mediterranean is facing extinction with the pillaging of this dwindling specie. The catches beyond the quotas are generally unreported and the countries that have the means to monitor and enforce agreements refuse to do so to protect their own fishing lobbies. The business of tuna fish is a very profitable activity to the point that so many fish farms have mushroomed around the Mediterranean Sea, in particular in Turkey where supplying fresh fish to these farms has been a priority for the underground players. ICCAT insists that tuna should be sold only to farms that it certifies for traceability and accountability purposes. But there is no guarantee that such rules are applied. In fact, many say that a massive black market that is operating below the radar screen of ICCAT has dominated the sector of late, and aqua farms are part of this network of illegal activity. In addition to their contribution in the pillaging of bluefin tuna, a great many aqua farms are used as money laundering platforms, and Algeria is often seen with suspicion as a component of such activity. Tuna that is unaccounted for is supplied to farms around the region and there is no doubt that quantities exceed those allows by ICCAT and acceptable to scientists. Last year, the national quota earmarked to domestic fishermen in Algeria was managed by an obscure consulting company that favored a single fishing company. That company is reported to have not enough resources. With its small fleet, it is unconceivable that it could handle the task. The company is also said to be owned by individuals who have positions at the fisheries ministry. This is obviously a blatant conflict of interest.
On May 12, 2007, this company was granted the permission to ink an agreement with Turkish businessman and head of the association of Turkish fish farmers, Nedim Ambar. While most observers have no problem with the contract in itself, the lack of its labeling as “export” raises questions about the nature and transparency of this deal, including the traceability of the fish caught under the terms of ICCAT. Critics now consider the agreement a hijacking of the Algerian quota by a foreign entity and its Algerian accomplices using legal loopholes. Recipient farms are said to be not licensed by ICCAT and an untold amount of money is lost by the Algerian treasury, in addition to the harm done to the sea’s ecosystem. The Turks have also been aggressive defending their interests in Algeria. News sources, in particular from El Watan and El Khabar newspapers have reported last year that after Turkey’s ANA Group won a contract to build 30 fishing boats, the Turks have decided to hold the delivery of the ships until Algeria agreed to renew a preferential agreement they had on Algerian tuna fishing. The details of such agreement are unknown. An investigation from EL Watan newspaper revealed that ANA may have originated in Algeria proper, closed its business there and re-opened in Turkey in form of two business entities. Strangely, while one of the two companies ANA International is owned by Turkish interests, ANA Maritime is owned by an Algerian man, who also happens to be a senior executive at the state bank BADR. This bank is the one that financed the construction of the trawlers in Turkey and the launch of ANA International.
Corruption and personal greed are part of the problem in the way bluefin tuna is disappearing along the Algerian shores. Only the return of the rule of law could bring transparency to an otherwise shadowy sector, with consequences on dwindling natural resources.
IN MOROCCO: A CANNING INDUSTRY IN DISARRAY
The tuna canning industry in Morocco is in disarray. Canning companies are facing enormous pressure, driven by collapsing catches and record prices in the import market. Well-known canning companies are not spared from the troubled tuna sector. Having been a popular kitchen item for so long, the bright orange Tam tuna can is nowhere to be found in Moroccan markets. Owned by the Marica Company, the production line for Tam stopped operating some three months ago. The Cosarno Company in Agadir, which owns the Isabel brand, gave up tuna canning several years ago. The next one to go is most likely the Laayoune-based Calvo, which has reduced production to bare minimum.
The culprit in the fast disappearing tuna canning industry in Morocco is the growing scarcity of tuna, which is making the now-rare product very expensive. Despite the positive statements coming from officials in Rabat, who often deny the existence of a crisis in the sector, industry officials have been sending alarming signals. Optimists say the problem is not a big deal. The halting of canning operations is only temporary, they argue, as fishing is seasonal and confined to the months of June to December. But such argument is weak since seasonal fishing has always existed, even when there was plenty of tuna. The industry is not collapsing because bans are enforced in the first half of the year to protect the required biological rest. But even assuming the ban is more pronounced, suppliers of fresh fish would have prepared and organized to avoid a halt in operations. Yet, none of that happened.
The reality is that the over-fishing of tuna in the region has led to a massive erosion of the fish stocks, despite the failed attempts by international organizations to slow the trends. The average annual catch of tuna has been 3.5 million tons worldwide. Yet the demand for that fish in 2007 exceeded supply by far, at an estimated 5 million tons. As such, prices have been rising to reach unprecedented levels. In 2005 the ton of tuna was traded at $300. Today it is more than three times that amount at $1,000.
In Morocco, fishing focuses on several types of tuna. Excluded form the tuna canning sector, is a small quantity of red tuna caught each year exclusively for the export market. The fresh or frozen red tuna is sold to Spain or Japan, essentially for sushi consumption. But the rest of the story shows a major collapse of mainstream tuna. The Moroccan fisheries ministry says that tuna catches fell from 8,800 tons in 2006 to a mere 343 tons in 2007. This is a massive 96% decrease. Traceable export volumes also dropped from 3,487 tons to 1,927 tons for the same period. Preliminary data from the statistics office shows a continued downward trend in 2008. Destined for the Spanish, French and Italian markets only 234,3 tons were exported in the first quarter of 2008. Still, tuna export accounts for less than 3% of Morocco’s canned fish export. The North African country sells canned fish in some 80 markets, generating some MAD 4 billion in revenue. Canned sardines or anchovies from Morocco can be found in major supermarkets in the United States. Sold in 44 countries, canned sardines account for 80% of Morocco’s exported canned fish. As of the end of April, nearly 22,000 tons of canned sardines were sold to foreign consumers.
Yet tuna remains an important product for many companies and current trends do not bode well for the specie itself, further highlighting their dangerously declining stocks. To face growing scarcity, tuna canners are forced to turn to the import market. But the traditional sources of imports for the Moroccans, neighboring Mauritania and Senegal, are witnessing their own predicament as their own stocks are dwindling. To compensate for their losses, tuna canning plants are using other species such as anchovies and mackerels. Many have also expanded their activities to include vegetable canning.
Despite alarming signals coming from the industry, government officials point to lack of management skills and strategic vision among the tuna companies, a position that the industry is denouncing as too simplistic. Yet at the end, the biggest looser in all of that is neither the industry, which derives only 3% of its export from tuna, nor the government. It is the tuna itself that is likely to suffer the most and our environmental ecosystem.