The Big Jelly Ball of Global Insecurity: Terrorism is now a Permanent Fixture

The recent attempt by a young Nigerian man to down a US airliner brought back the topic of terrorism on the front pages of newspapers around the world. While the attempt failed given the fast reaction of passengers, as well as the poor execution of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the alleged terrorist, the impact has been important; the visibility of Al-Qaeda and global terrorism has increased considerably as a result. Although no one was harmed, Al-Qaeda managed a good media coup whether it directly planned it or not. The would-be terrorist has also prompted a lot of attention on Yemen, its poverty, mismanagement and potential to become a new haven for international terrorism in a manner similar to Afghanistan or even Somalia.

Abdulmutallab has focused attention on Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, which claimed responsibility for the attempted bombing of the Delta Airlines Airbus 330. The debate finally focused on Yemen, where Abdulmutallab is said to have obtained the explosive device and training; inevitably, the conclusion is that the terrorist threat from Yemen is growing.

The reality is that global terrorism defies the theories of classic warfare as we’ve known them. It is re-writing the books. Even the techniques of urban terror the way they were depicted in the Gillo Pontecorvo’s 1966 movie ‘The Battle of Algiers,’ no longer apply.  The conflict is not localized, as shown in the film, where a combination of military operations and enforcement can confine it. Global insurgencies have moved into a new direction, one that, from an organizational standpoint functions like a virtual corporation, leveraging modern technology with a lean central command from where ideological directions and support are given to a growing number of subsidiaries.

Given the decentralized nature of Al Qaeda, its leaders are not just focused on agile subsidiaries; they also recruit lone agents who would carry out suicide missions or other forms of terror attacks. In this case, given the social and economic troubles afflicting millions of people, there is no shortage of candidates.

The current strategy pursued by Al Qaeda is one that involves a multi-front warfare approach involving two or three big theaters of operation in the midst of a multitude of smaller war zones and the occasional lone individual terrorist or suicide agent.  What exactly is happening in the global terrorism world could be illustrated by what we like to call the Big Jelly Ball of Global Insecurity. Just think for one moment of a giant ball of jelly placed above your head and you are holding it with your hands on each side. The problem for you is that just as you think you are controlling the right side, the left side of it begins to drip and fall. Now you quickly rush to control the left side, only to realize that the right side is yet again unstable. Here again, we are talking about just the left and the right sides, fully aware that a balancing act requires the control of the front and back sides of the ball as well.

While this is an over simplified illustration of the issue, the Jelly Ball example can be applied in the context of global world of insecurity. In the case of Al Qaeda – one of several groups around the world that do not adhere to Western views of politics - it is about a multi-front warfare strategy; one that involves, for the moment, two or three big theaters such as Afghanistan and Iraq, accompanied by a multitude of smaller wars or crisis zones such as the Sahel and Yemen. The goal is to exhaust foes in a marathon like scenario rather than in a ‘100-meter sprint’ as Western armies would likely prefer. Their aim is to prevent immediate conflict resolutions, entangling western governments, forcing them to chase events in various parts of the world for as long as possible.

The strategy is to exhaust Western powers in a long protracted battle waged by small groups or even individuals while draining enormous resources from these same foes. The goal here is to drain strength and resolve from western armies in a marathon-like race, reducing any opportunity for a ‘shock-and-awe’ approach. In this context, organized traditional armed forces will need to adjust by incorporating advanced intelligence on the ground and extremely lean armed units in order to respond quickly. This also suggests that Al Qaeda has the resources to maintain a long-term race.

Al-Qaeda’s central command relies on the subsidiaries for execution, yet the subsidiaries are still autonomous from an operational standpoint. They can execute, raise money, recruit, purchase weapons at the local or regional level without getting bogged down by the sort of top-down model used by other organization types or corporations. The subsidiaries and the central command share the same grievances and a sense of common purpose. Moreover, like any global corporation, there are also branding strategies such that the name ‘Al-Qaeda’, followed by the region of  activity, like Maghreb or Arabian Peninsula.

Al Qaeda Central and its subsidiaries’ common purposes are essentially to undermine Western presence in the Muslim world and beyond, and challenge the governing regimes and elites in the various regions they are targeting. Lack of democratization in the Arabo-Islamic world is a key issue that will continue to stimulate action among insurgents.

The subsidiaries are now focused on building their presence in economically depressed regions, essentially in places where governments are weak or practically non-existent. Yet these regions are often close to targeted areas so action can be achieved and retreat would follow easily. To make the situation even more complex, these organizations are linked to global criminal networks from human smugglers in the Sahel to international drug traffickers.

As things stand, the conflict between the Al Qaeda and the West (or its perceived proxies) is permanent. Unless major grievances are tackled, the Big Jelly Ball will remain difficult to stabilize, even if it may seem to be the case from time to time.  More precisely, a solution to the conflict requires a multi-faced strategy with actions taken simultaneously not only in the areas of enforcement and military, as it has been the case, but requires also political and economic measures. A solution starts at least with solving the big visible issues, including the fate of the Arab-Israeli conflict, revisiting Western support to the dictatorships in the Arab world, reintroducing a sustainable path of democratization, and inviting moderate Islamists to share in the governance, in addition to enforcement and military action. Lack of progress in these areas guarantees that the Jelly Ball of Global Insecurity remains unstable.

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