Neighboring Algeria is where the first implications of the French intervention in Mali were felt. It took a handful of terrorists to take over a gas site on the Libya border to realize that the war in Mali will undoubtedly impact the rest of the region. Although Algeria managed to eliminate the terrorists who perpetrated the attack, the implications on that country’s critical hydrocarbons infrastructure were felt immidiatly as many leading oil and gas companies scaled back their activities there. Among oil and insurance executives there is a greater degree of reluctance to return to Algeria for the time being.

But Algeria, with its relatively large military capabilities, is the least potential hot spot as we look at the Sahel in the mid term. Pushed by the French toward the northeast Mali, the Jihadists have been holding their positions in a mountain formation called Adrad des Ifoghas, where caves are being used as natural hideouts, just as it happened in remote and isolated Afghan regions. The Jihadists are said to have sufficient food, medicines, water and ammunition to remain there for an extended period of time. But naturally, there have been ongoing efforts to escape the north of Mali and several choices are available to the Jihadists. The most sought after solution is a movement toward southern Libya via Niger’s northern desert, along the border with Algeria. Southern Libya is a region that the Muamar Gaddafi toppling has turned into a land of lawlessness. It is there where the Jihadists can procure arms and ammunition to dispatch them to whatever hotspot du-jour would be. They do that without fearing any military reaction since the authorities in Tripoli are too weak to control or impose effective enforcement. In some sense, Southern Libya has become the big ammunition depot of the Jihadists in the Sahara.

En route to Libya, the Jihadists coming from Mali pass through the poorly controlled Aïr Mountains in Niger. It is there that Al-Qaeda operatives sought to set up a base in 2012 from which they would link with their connections in Southern Libyan. But local tribal chiefs stood against Al-Qaeda settlement efforts fearing that it would bring unwanted scrutiny that would inevitably lead to conflicts. But as the French military continues on its hunt, Al-Qaeda elements could easily seek refuge there once again, imposing themselves on poorly protected tribes and seeking to attack Niger and French interests in the south.

The Air Mountains eventually lead eastbound toward what is called the Salvador Pass, a crossing point into Libya, and where actually the borders of Libya, Algeria and Niger meet. Until February 2013, this route was reportedly used by heavily armed Jihadists moving on pickup trucks from Libya into Mali. And Niger is most likely in the minds of these armed gangs. France, which is chasing them out of Mali has important mining interests in Niger. The French are providing support to a military protection of the Arlit uranium mines in Niger, owned by French corporation Areva. The Americans have also been invited to get their Predator drones to operate out of Agades, in the north of the country, with the purpose of monitoring Libya and northern Mali, as well as the Niger territory. The Jihadists themselves have recognized an increase in drone activity. For them, in particular the West African branch known as MUJAO, Niger may very well be the next country to destabilize. Niger is fully aware of the looming risk. Its President, Mahamadou Issoufou was among the first regional leaders to call for a military intervention in Mali. Fearing a Jihadist movement toward Niger, he dispatched 700 soldiers within Mali to secure its border with his country.

To the west of Mali is Senegal, a country that could easily be dragged into the crisis given that many of the issues that led to the collapse of Mali can be found there. Indeed the Senegalese, and the French, have real reasons to worry, starting with the many Senegalese nationals who have joined the ranks of the West African Jihadists of the MUJAO. Among those MUJAO Senegalese are the many who have failed to immigrate to Europe, and joined the MUJAO as an alternative solution. There are others, so-called Talibes, young religious students who have more militant goals in mind, having been ideologically trained in a network of religious schools in Senegal. These individuals come from abject poverty where the opportunity to improve one’s social and economic profile is non existent and where the religious teachings have shifted from peaceful Sufism teachings and practices to the more militant and aggressive Wahabist and Salafist leaning, with religious Madrasas funded by Gulf monarchies.

As is the case of Mali, which suffered for decades due to an internal conflict pitting the central government in Bamako against the ethnic Touaregs in the north, Senegal has a similar conflict down in the southwest in the Casamance region. There, the Jola ethnic group has been calling for greater autonomy, some even calling for an independent state because of economic neglect from Dakar. In 1982 the separatist movement “the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance” was formed, and an armed branch was established three years later to confront the Senegalese government. Violence has been relatively under control and sporadic, although tensions flare up occasionally as the region’s grievances have not been solved. Foreign meddling in this affair has become evident after Senegal interdicted a ship with arms moving into the region and allegedly funded by Iran.

And so the very same environment of illegal arms dealing that is financed by drug trafficking and other criminal activity is seen in both Mali and Senegal, and certainly elsewhere in the Sahel. Like in northern Mali, military officers and soldiers in the Casamance are poorly paid. Long established civil and religious authorities have no power to influence and solve crises. Others, essentially extremist voices tend to fill the gap. Like in Mali, the state-funded education system in Casamance is dysfunctional and increasingly surpassed by a more religious leaning curriculum.

For analysts who have been covering the Casamance conflict, the Jihadist fear is not necessarily one that involves foreigners, but more likely a home grown phenomena. But it’s only a matter of time before MUJAO and Al-Qaeda turn this region into another land for Jihad.

The targets in the Sahel for the Jihadists are many. The proximity to Mali make Niger and Senegal and by extension Libya, potentially Mauritania as prime targets. But other nations with poor economic resources and weak militaries could very well be on the radar screen. Nigeria, already struggling with Boko Haram and splinter groups, Burkina Faso, Chad and many others should be concerned about what can happen in the mid term. Coordinating their efforts to face greater danger will be required.

And so the question remains is whether the French intervention in Mali was only about rooting out the Jihadists from the north of the country or to have a more lasting effect on cleaning up the region. If the end-game was to clean Northern Mali, then mission accomplished. If eliminating the Jihadist threat in the Sahel is France’s end goal, then one has to ask the question whether Monsieur Holland will have enough political capital and resources to wage a long war. With France facing economic challenges of its own, getting French voters’ support for a long-term campaign in the Sahel is guaranteed to be a difficult task for Holland.

Consider some of the names that are on the radar screens of investigators and legal authorities around the world: Italian and French energy giants ENI and Total, which have also received formal requests from the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. The American enforcer of securities laws is checking whether these companies have broken any law when they delt with the Gaddafi regime under the U.S. Foreign Corruption Practice Act. Interinstingly, recent Libya’s oil minister Abdurahman Benyezza in the government of Abdurrahim El-Keib, used to be an executive at ENI.  There is no proof of wrongdoing yet, but these companies, like many others are on the defensive, just like Yara International in Norway and SNC Lavalin in Canada, two companies that are facing a major damage to their reputation.

In Algeria, corruption probes are moving at slow pace but pressure from the press and investigations abroad are prompting judges to try to do something. Their hands are often tied because these cases involve very powerful men like ex-oil Minister Chakib Khelil and relatives of former Foreign Minister Mohamed Bedjaoui.  Here’s a sample of cases we’ve been following:

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Algerian Government Ministers Implicated in Corruption Cases: All Eyes on Chakib Khelil and Others

ENI-Saipem Hit by Corruption Scandal on Algeria Business 

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SNC-Lavalin: Collateral Damage of Dealing with Dictatorships

Damage control and reputational risk are a few things the Canadian engineering giant SNC-Lavalin is currently experiencing firsthand. As the company celebrates one hundred years of business, it is facing unprecedented scrutiny related to its dealings with the Gaddafi family of Libya. Key senior executives have already lost their jobs as the company is going through damage control, and construction contracts in other parts of the world are being questioned. Now, a former Canadian ambassador to Tripoli could be dragged down into this affair, as the press continues to dig deep into corporate dealings that have gone bad like a Hollywood movie plot. The cost of doing business in Libya has suddenly increased rapidly for the company and its troubles may not be over…

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Another Deal Gone Wrong in Libya: Yara in the Limelight

In the immediate aftermath of the end of the Gaddafi regime, scandals of all sorts involving alleged corruption, improper payments and bad business practices have began to surface. One of them involves Yara International, the Norwegian company that owns half of the Libyan Norwegian Fertilizer firm (Lifeco), which has been charged in its home country with “aggravated corruption” in connection with its Libyan joint venture.

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Selling the Good and the Evil: Unit of Bull Supplied Internet Interception System to Gaddafi

 Although SNC-Lavalin’s case of dealing with the Gaddafi regime may be the most troublesome to emerge to date, the Canadian company is not only one being scrutinized for exercising bad judgment. Other companies and Western politicians are beginning to show on the radar screens of the media and independent observers, and we suspect many more to come. Among the latest to deal with the hot topic of the Gaddafi liability is France’s Amesys, which has sold spy technology to the Libyan regime at the heights of its dictatorship.

January 13, 2013
Mali Crisis Expanding: Mass Kidnapping of Westerners in a Saharan Oil Base

Written by Said Temsamani*

“Islamism is a term that has been used to describe two very different trends,” wrote Maha Azzam, an associate fellow at Chatham House, in a recent paper on the implications of the Arab spring for British foreign policy earlier this year.

“First, [it describes] the non-violent quest for an Islamic-friendly society based on the ‘principles of Islam’, which can involve a more liberal application of Islamic teachings and tradition or a more strict interpretation. Second, Islamism is also associated with violent extremism, most notably that of al-Qaida in the promotion of terrorism.”

For about two centuries now, Moroccans, like the vast majority of Arabs and Muslims, have been searching for a magical formula that would allow them to stay true to their traditions and faith and, at the same time, catch up to the scientific, commercial, and political prowess of Europe and the West.   Delegations were sent to France to check out the wonders of modern French civilization; individuals travelled and lived in European and American capitals; Western products fill the shelves of every Arab and Muslim supermarket, from Dubai to Casablanca; we get dressed in Western-style military uniforms and carry Western weapons; we proudly fly Western-style flags and recite national anthems at sports events; we use the Internet, cell phones, and every Western-made gadget to show that we are as capable as anyone else to live in the modern world; we travel the world in Western-made planes, fuelled by Western-extracted and processed technologies; we seek—no, demand—Western-style democracy and a long list of social and human rights, while condemning the West for its arrogance and gross materialistic culture.

Abdellah Laroui, the great Moroccan historian, noted a long time ago that we are alienated (note that the word in Arabic, taghrib, is, etymologically, tied to the West, as if to be alienated is to be Westernized) between modernity and tradition. It is a fairly safe bet to expect that most of my fellow Moroccans reading this article are major consumers of Western products, but they most probably find refuge in an imagined past of upright ancestors, hazily pictured as ideal and wholesome, thanks to the sermons (khutab) that inundate our streets and souks, and stream through radio waves and the Internet. No Western-made medium exemplifies this schizophrenic state better than Al Jazeera television.  A slick Western-style production, financed by a state that is deeply embedded in the global financial system, is keeping hundreds of millions of Arabs and Muslims stultified in front of their TV sets—raging at the West, but incapable of finding their way out to the freedom they have long sought.

As much as anything else, what we need in Morocco right now is to be what we choose.  All Moroccans should have the right to live as they please and question and write about any subject that interests them. Moroccan artists and scientists should have absolute license to create and invent; men and women should pursue their dreams and desires however they imagine them; and businesspeople should have ironclad guarantees that their investments are protected by strong laws.  If our model of freedom is France, Britain, or Canada, then we have no option but to enshrine these freedoms, which include the right to any opinion, however offensive it may be to tradition, without being harassed by self-appointed guardians of ancestral ways.

The new mudawwana (family law) and women’s right to share their Moroccan nationality with their children are gifts of secular policies, not religious ones.  But now, we are back to the Middle Ages, when religion ruled supreme in both Europe and the world of Islam. For one of the fundamental tenets of modern political systems is the separation of religion from politics. Technically, as the founders of democracy in ancient Greece knew, gods may be worshipped privately at home or in temples, but they have no place in a political, citizen-based system. Democracy, properly understood, and theology, do not mix well.

We may move, however slowly and frustratingly, toward more political accountability, but we will not make much progress if we don’t open our own selves to inquiry.  Each of us, I am afraid, hosts a little tyrant inside.  We have a hard time accepting differences in our midst. We want our friends and neighbors to share our beliefs; if they don’t, we hammer them with advice and what we call maw`idha. Few Muslim Moroccans have Christian, Jewish, Buddhist, or atheist Moroccan friends. We wake up and go to sleep in a vast ocean of sameness. We like the West for the liberties it offers, but we don’t do much to have them at home. This is why political revolutions are far easier to implement than cultural ones. Yet, without a solid cultural foundation that emancipates people from the fear of ghosts and spirits, we will remain mugharrabun, alienated between a future we desire and a past that pulls hard at our coattails and jellabas.

We may need another protest movement after the one known as “February 20th” does its work and recedes into the margins of Morocco’s new future. The democracies that are emerging now of the debris of war and turmoil—Iraq, Tunisia, Egypt, Libya—and regimes that seem to be on the verge of collapse— Syria—are lessons for Moroccans to ponder. The non-Muslim people who have lived in Iraq since ancient times—including Jews and Christians—have either left the country for good or are in the process of doing so. Christian Arabs are threatened in most Muslim-majority nations.  If we stay on this path, Arab states will more likely resemble the Iran of the ayatollahs than Spain or Switzerland. Is that what we want for our country?

A society, or nation, reaches its maximum potential when it allows its members to create and prosper without fear from cops or imams. If our political, social, and economic systems were to be well regulated—as the new constitution calls for—Moroccans could potentially unleash their intellectual and economic powers to create and share, invent and sell.  The state could then collect more taxes to finance education, medical care, and major national projects.  Poverty will diminish, prosperity could become more widespread, faith will be genuine, and more people will experience life at its fullest.

This is what freedom is all about.  To me, it is less about what political parties do or don’t do, and more about maximizing the enrichment of human experience on earth. It is about equal opportunity and fulfilling work, whether one is white or black, Muslim or Christian, young or old, man or woman. We could still seek salvation through religion, but that won’t stop our society from developing and join more scientifically advanced nations. Let’s hope we get a taste of this new social order soon.  Moroccans all lucky to have a legitimate religious institution (Commander of the Faithful) that guarantees freedom of worship to all faiths (Muslims, Jews and Christians) with no restriction.   Moroccans would like to see powerful political parties with clear platforms that answer their immediate needs and expectations for a real economic growth and not a religious discourse that unfortunately sometimes becomes extremist.

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Said Temsamani

 Said Temsamani is a Moroccan Political analyst and consultant who follows events in his country and across North Africa. He is a former Senior Political Advisor at the US Embassy in Rabat.

Last week, Morocco’s King Mohammed VI visited Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Jordan, Kuwait, and the UAE as part of long-term efforts and planning to boost political and economic cooperation among nations that share centuries-old cultural, religious, and linguistic ties.  While the King certainly carried goodwill, he also had in tow an ample supply of Morocco’s most valued national resource: vision.

For nearly two years, Morocco’s neighborhood has seen protests for reforms, some violent, others resulting in regime change and all with varying measures of success.  Following these Arab uprisings, the region, including Morocco, faces significant challenges. The King seeks to share with his country’s regional partners Morocco’s experience of achieving meaningful reform peacefully, through consultation, collaboration, and consensus – while maintaining security and stability.

King Mohamed of Morocco and Kuwait's Sheikh Sabah Al Ahmad Al Jaber Al Sabah

Socioeconomic demands were at the root of the Arab uprisings which means that regional economic cooperation is an indispensable component of any successful plan to provide and sustain broad economic development and empowerment for nearly a half billion people.  Morocco has long understood this and has pursued multi-sector initiatives and partnerships as part of a larger strategic vision to bolster economic cooperation among its neighbors. One such initiative, the Agadir Agreement, signed in 2006, established a free trade zone among Morocco, Jordan, Tunisia, Egypt, and Palestine and trade has increased more than 45% among those countries. Trade between Morocco and Saudi Arabia went from $1 billion in 2000 to $20 billion in 2011 and the investment of GCC countries for development projects in Morocco, high on the King’s tour agenda, are expected to be $1 billion per year in 2012-2016.

In addition to promoting economic cooperation, Morocco, a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council in 2012-13, has played a critical role alongside the United States and other international partners in addressing the crisis in Syria and will host the upcoming Friends of Syria meeting.  While in Jordan, King Mohammed VI became the first head of state to visit the Zaatari refugee camp, which houses upwards of 200,000 displaced Syrians who depend on donated medical and humanitarian aid and services from the international community, including a clinic provided by Morocco.

The King also carried the message that interfaith dialogue and religious tolerance are hallmarks of the Moroccan approach to peaceful cohabitation.  As Chairman of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation’s Al-Quds Committee, King Mohammed VI continues Morocco’s historic role as a key interlocutor for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and reviving the peace process is an area of cooperation the King emphasized with his counterparts.

Morocco’s vision for progress and initiatives with its Gulf neighbors have implications for US foreign policy interests.  In order to promote stability by protecting security in the region, the US must have a partner who shares its values and principles.  Morocco, which maintains the longest unbroken treaty relationship with the US, is that trusted, reliable ally. Just a few weeks ago, Morocco and the US launched their Strategic Dialogue, one of fewer than two dozen such agreements in existence and the first in North Africa.  The Strategic Dialogue builds upon more than a decade of focused, comprehensive leadership and cooperation by King Mohammed VI with three US Administrations and allows the two countries to work towards progress and prosperity for the Middle East and North Africa. 

Recently, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton said that Morocco, under the King’s leadership, is answering the “call” for democratic reforms, is elevating its role as an international partner and that the US “looks to Morocco to be a leader and a model.”  King Mohamed’s regional tour demonstrates that Morocco takes that call seriously and hopes its neighbors can benefit from its experience and vision.

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Ambassador Edward Gabriel

Amb. Gabriel has an extensive background in international affairs, having convened multilateral policy forums involving national security, environmental, trade, and energy issues. He has been involved in matters of Russian and European nuclear non-proliferation and safety, and he has been active in advising the US Government on Mideast policy matters. From November, 1997-March 2001, he was the US Ambassador to the Kingdom of Morocco during which time a new US-Morocco strategic relationship was launched on political, military, and economic levels.
Ambassador Gabriel is also active with non-profit organizations. He is a Visiting Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a member of the Global Advisory Board of George Washington University, a founding member and Vice Chairman of the American Task Force for Lebanon, a member of the boards of Amid East, the Keystone Center, the Tangier American Legation Museum, the Casablanca American School, and the American School of Tangier. He holds a B.S. degree (business) from Gannon University.

Jeremy Bowen focused on his experiences in Libya when he discussed his latest book:  The Arab Uprisings: the people want the fall of the regime,  during a lecture at  the London School of Economics.

Bowen,  who was an undergraduate at the LSE during the late 70s, said that one of the privileges of being a news reporter for the BBC is that at times you find yourself in a place in the world where everybody wants to know what is happening that day.

“I was very conscious of that in February last year when I was in the Rixos Hotel in Tripoli, the five star golden cage where the Gaddafi regime had installed journalists they had let in. Saif Al Islam thought he could manipulate the media. He turned up in fine knit wear and said ‘while you are here you may hear bangs and crashes in the night but let me assure you they are fireworks as people will be celebrating the triumph of my father and his regime. What we have is a local difficulty’.”

Jeremy Bowen's Book The Arab Uprisings: the people want the fall of the regime

Bowen admitted that as a journalist you give up a certain amount of autonomy and freedom for the chance to pull back the curtain and peak inside the dark kingdom. In Libya that involved  quite a bit of sneaking around.  To get up and about in Libya required a rat like cunning to get to places like Tajoura the satellite town of Tripoli, a hot bed of revolutionary activity.

He described his interview with Colonel Gaddafi – like so many things in Gaddafi’s Libya it happened at the last minute. The interview was secured by the son of Libya’s head of intelligence Abdullah Al  Senussi dressed as a designer urban guerrilla.

“One of the strange things about the inside of the Gaddafi regime was that they were very star-conscious. He had on a green combat style designer jacket of beautiful fabric and a black Kashmir hat.”

Bowen recalled wanting to change into a suit but Senussi told him he looked fine.  Surprisingly the interview was held in a  very trendy glass and steel Italian restaurant overlooking Tripoli docks. Gaddafi conformed to  his image  and was dressed in beautiful robes. That was before the call by the Arab League for a no-fly zone and the vote in the United Nations for all necessary measures to be taken against Gaddafi’s Libya to protect civilians.  That phrase is what NATO interpreted as a  charter for regime change.

“At the time the international constellation of forces had not coalesced against Gaddafi and he was self confident. Gaddafi was where he wanted to be – taking on the world. A few years later I was at the UN General Assembly where Gaddafi gave an extraordinary rambling speech, complete with the yellow pad which he held up. During the interview he was very willing to talk. I managed to irritate him enough to switch into English. He said :”My people love me, they will die for me.”  For the Libyans seeing the brother Leader being asked direct questions was a totally new experience. I didn’t think Gaddafi was mad. He was bad. He lived in quite a bubble. He was surrounded by cheering crowds wherever he went. He had spilt a lot of blood, he felt his power was pretty secure. He quite liked being what Ronald Reagan described as the ‘mad dog’ of the Middle East, feeling it is me against the world.”

Bowen also described Mousa Ibrahim, Gaddafi’s spokesman who was humble at first but later became more confident as he got closer to the regime. He asked Bowen to get him on the BBC Hard Talk programme. “I think he was someone who thought he was living the dream.  He said:’ it is incredible, a year ago I was a student in London now I am on hard talk’.”

The BBC correspondent admitted that he was taken by surprise by the Arab  uprisings – but so were Messrs Gaddafi, Assad, Mubarak and Ben Ali. He was in Cairo at the beginning of the protests and believed he would be home for the weekend. There were many fires smouldering . The organiser of one of the protests in Cairo admitted that he was surprised as well.  There was a proud history of protests in Cairo but the protesters chanted and were then in the back of police vans getting a kicking.

“I saw old men, some of them practically dressed in rags throwing themselves against the police. I thought to myself Mubarak has got a big problem. This thing could get a critical mass. I was in Iran after the Green Movement protested about the outcome of the elections but after a week the protesters were down to the people from North Tehran and  students. Against  the thugs the regimes put against them they did not have a chance.”

Bowen pointed out that the aging leaders were grooming their sons to succeed them. That was one of the factors that pushed people towards the edge and made them take the risks that they took. Simple statistics show that 60 percent of the population across the region is under 30. The new generation is one of the strong factors driving the uprising. For their parents generation the share of the cake was enough to have a bit of a social contract. Politics and opposing the regime was not allowed but they had jobs. Now they were struggling to get jobs and get married. Once the Ben Ali regime fell the Egyptians were confident they could rid of Mubarak.

Bowen believes that the social media was an effective organising tool but it was satellite tv that spread the word.  Al Jazeera became a  chief cheer leader for the rebellion. He agrees with an Israeli journalist who accused the Western media of focusing too much on the Arab-Israeli conflict and ignoring Arab politics.

“If this is a five act play we are at the end of the second act. There is a lot more to come. In the beginning a lot of people outside the region thought it would be like 1989 in Europe  - a domino effect. There was a counter revolution. Gaddafi and Assad concluded that it was not an inevitable process but Mubarak and Ben Ali made the mistake of not using enough force. The army in Egypt and Tunisia was prepared to park itself between the regime and the people.

“If you want to track the ways things will go in the next few years it is quite a good idea to track the Sunni Shia divide. The fault line that runs across the region is becoming sharper. This is a force which can be used to manipulate and motivate people. The rebellion in Bahrain has become more sectarian.”

Bowen concluded there is now an engrained habit of protest. People took to the streets to get rid of their leaders and if there are attempts to postpone the elections they will go out onto the streets again. The experience of holding office will certainly change the complexion of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Egyptians feel they need an economy that works rather than religious ideology.

“Voting does not bring democracy but it does bring change and I think that change will  continue.”

Jeremy Bowen has been the BBC’s Middle East correspondent for twelve years and has been on the ground for them as the recent revolutions  swept through the region.  His latest book looks at the world the demonstrators rejected and its Arab dictators. The author examines  brutal police states, tribal loyalty and foreign help. The West’s response and Israel’s  forms part of the narrative. This is an authoritative account of the seismic political changes rocking the Middle East, from one of the foremost reporters of our time.

The following is a series of articles focusing on the rise of the Islamists and the issues they currently face among themselves and in relations to the secular movement

With the Rise of Ansar al-Sharia in Libya and Tunisia, Al Qaeda Starts New Offensive in North Africa

The assassination of American diplomats in Libya has brought to the forefront a new Salafist group with Jihadist tendencies called Ansar al-Sharia. Although the attack against the American consular office was seemingly carried out as a retaliation for an amateur movie insulting to Islam and its Prophet Mohamed, all fingers point to Ansar al-Sharia as being behind the killings for reasons that are not necessarily related to the film in question.

The War Within: Salafists vs. Moderates

In the aftermath of the toppling of many Arab dictators, Islamist politicians have come into the forefront of governance and are now seemingly in control. But as they move into halls of power in Tunis, Cairo, Rabat and elsewhere, we discover that Political Islam is not as homogenous as many thought. Philosophical differences and ideological gaps exist between the various stakeholders that are likely to make the transition to a stable region a difficult and bumpy road.

 Tunisia and the Salafist Threat

The general security climate in Tunisia has deteriorated and government response has been timid and inefficient. Given the Islamist offensive appears well organized, it is likely part of an effort to destabilize Tunisia and derail its efforts to recover from a disastrous 2011. The recent call made by Al-Qaida leader Ayman Al-Zawahiri for the Tunisian people to rise up against the Ennahda Islamist ruling party was followed immediately by a series of actions that took place in Tunisia, demonstrating that Al-Qaeda and its remaining leaders have the ability to strike. Relaying Al-Zawahiri’s call, young clerics in Tunisia followed up with their own local calls for action. Among them is the extremist figure Abu Ayoub Ettounsi who called on the Tunisians to revolt after the prayer session of June 15, 2012. The same man called for the destruction of the studios of the TV channels Nessma. And so Tunisia may now very well be in the eye of the storm.

How to Secure the Sahel

Thursday night, the northern Mali region of Kidal witnessed the first wave of serious clashes between the Touaregs and so-called Islamist group Ansar Dine, a group under the influence of Al-Qaeda. The event is critically important in that it confirms that the two groups, the Touaregs organized under the independence movement of the MNLA and the Al-Qaeda operatives in the region (Ansar Dine) have different agendas. As their key leaders have often stated, the Touaregs have not pledged allegiance to foreign Jihadist influences and will not do any time soon. That in itself is not only encouraging, but a major opportunity for those fighting the Jihadists and seeking to root them out. A fresh approach to the Sahel is needed and without an active participation of the Touaregs, the Sahel will remain a dangerous zone. Here’s why.

Debt Crisis in the Moroccan Subsidy System: Undesirable Gift for Islamist PM

There is a bumpy road ahead for the new government leader in Rabat. As he enters his offices, both excited and energized by a fresh electoral victory with the prospect of governing a nation, Prime Minister Benkirane has to deal with the country’s accounting books, and what he sees does not please him. The ledger looks dangerous and could force him to chose between making unpopular decisions or maintain a financially unsustainable status quo.

Although Morsi, member of the once scrutinized Muslim Brotherhood affiliated Freedom and Justice party, was sworn in as Egypt’s first civil President, his victory was anything but a sweeping win and  the revolutionary battle is far from over, as among the earlier challenges that Morsi has to coup up with included, national reconciliation and engagement with liberal opposition, to deal with the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) in context to the dissolution of parliament and the SCAF’s constitutional declaration that limited much of his powers, had undercut state budget and granted the military power to arrest protestors and civilians, then drafting a new constitution and election of a new Parliament,the rehabilitation of state economy and defunct security apparatus.

While on the external front, to review Cairo’s relations with Turkey, US, Saudi Arabia and Iran, must convince and reasssure the paranoid Western world, terrfied of an Islamist government and the Shariah Rule that this loyal old Western ally would remain an open and tolerant society, and this new regime does not mark ‘ the beginning of Islamization’ in Egypt. Howere the real concern here was the  impact of the 180 degree change in goverence on the Arab-Isreal issue but the fiercely pro-Palestinian leader has pledged to honour Egypt’s international treaties, which include a 1979 peace treaty with Israel and take control of Sinai after recent attacks at Israeli border. He also paid an official visit to Saudi Arabia, met Hamas leader, khaled Meeshal, and attended African Union Summit to improve his diplomatic relations with foreign countries.

Under the recent developments in Egypt, Morsi not only ordered to reconvene the Parliament, announced the release of political war detainees, many of which are from Islamist groups, and the appointment of a woman and a Christian to a vice president positions in the government but also appointed Hesham Kandil, a religious Muslim- a technocrat rather than a hardliner and not member of Muslim brotherhood as his Prime Minister. His newly elected cabinet comprises figures of the Egyptian financial elite with representatives from the Egyptian military, the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood (MB), former ministers of the interim government of Prime Minister Kamal Ganzouri, and various technocrats.  He made no move to antagonize Egypt’s military and the Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, kept his post.Two of the 35 ministers are women, and only one is a Coptic Christian. All this has raised skepticism about Morsi’s administration which has shown little luck in placating secular and other liberal opponents but the Egypt’s current leader understands well that his country not only needs a political reform but a practical socio-economic uplifting as the future of the democracy and stability in the region depends on what would happen in Egypt. Mr. Morsi put it himself ‘“The revolution goes on, carries on until all the objectives of the revolution are achieved and together we will complete this march.”

With such drastic and unprecedented change in the leadership of Egypt, the world is watching, fingers are crossed that would this middle-eastern power under Morsi actually succeed in achieving the democratic freedom for which it has fought for nearly 17 months, for which it sacrificed nearly 850 lives or would this country relapse and slip back into the hands of the more experienced and established military autocracy?

 The writer, Aymen Ijaz works for the Islamabad Policy Research Institute.

The general security climate in Tunisia has deteriorated and government response has been timid and inefficient.  Given the Islamist offensive appears well organized, it is likely part of an effort to destabilize Tunisia and derail its efforts to recover from a disastrous 2011.

The recent call made by Al-Qaida leader Ayman Al-Zawahiri for the Tunisian people to rise up against the Ennahda Islamist ruling party was followed immediately by a series of actions that took place in Tunisia, demonstrating that Al-Qaeda and its remaining leaders have the ability to strike. Relaying Al-Zawahiri’s call, young clerics in Tunisia followed up with their own local calls for action. Among them is the extremist figure Abu Ayoub Ettounsi who called on the Tunisians to revolt after the prayer session of June 15, 2012. The same man called for the destruction of the studios of the TV channels Nessma. And so Tunisia may now very well be in the eye of the storm.

After labor unions somewhat eased tension following their earlier confrontations with the business sector and the government, now Islamist militants have come to the forefront, making the security issue Tunisia’s number one problem today.

Cases of extremist Salafists spreading fear across Tunisia have accelerated over the past week, courtesy of Al-Zawahiri and his followers. The purpose is essentially to scare the interim government and the administration headed by the moderate Islamist party Ennahda in an effort to imposed Sharia style law.

Confrontations between police and Salafists have taken place this week in the western suburbs of the capital Tunis.  The neighborhoods of Cité Intilaka, M’nihla, and Ennogra were invaded by black flags and large crowds of young Islamist militants taking over local cafes. Similar confrontations took place in areas like Carthage, Kram and La Marsa, where militants attacked the arts house Abdellia Palace. A police station in Carthage Byrsa was also targeted.  In Sousse, the Fine Arts Institute was attacked with a cocktail Molotov. Arts and culture are prime targets for the Salafists, so much so that calls for the killing of politicians who support arts were made and posted on social networks.

The situation has gotten so bad that the military has expanded security around the Presidential palace in Carthage.

In this confrontation between the Salafists and the fragile interim government, criminals are playing a significant role in spreading terror. Indeed police have arrested some 90 perpetrators of attacks against a variety of establishments, including liquor stores, who are confirmed to already have criminal records.

This escalation of events does not bode well for Tunisia in the short and mid term. This is likely to distract the central government from dealing with real structural issues and focus on enforcement.

The Salafist movement is often driven by inexperience and highly emotional youth that are often manipulated by outside forces, including Iran. Their insistence on making unrealistic changes based on the Sharia law in countries like Tunisia where the population has always been liberal, often leads to a protracted period of confrontation with the military, with the silent support of the majority as we have seen that in neighboring Algeria. If such insistence continues, the intervention of the military will be inevitable and Tunisia will become another red dot in Al-Zawahiri’s theater of operations’ map.