The North Africa Journal: Deconstructing Libya Part 1- Libya-Europe: Security, Illegal Immigration and Oil and Gas

Deconstructing Libya Part 1- Libya-Europe: Security, Illegal Immigration and Oil
and Gas
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Alessandro Bruno on 29 August, 2009 03:48:00
 
In a series of analyses, The North Africa Journal will deconstruct Libya’s
current position and future outlook. Various papers will be released with focus
on domestic, regional, international and economic affairs. Special emphasis will
be given to the most critical points that are currently affecting Libya, its
neighbors and the global community. In this issue, we address Libya’s current
position vis-à-vis Europe, as well as a short analysis on how we believe
British companies have a lot to gain in a post-Magrahi era, despite lack of
tangible evidence of a conspiracy. In upcoming analyses, we will look at
Libya’s African ambitions, global stance, the issue of terrorism, and that of
oil and gas, and the problem of succession in a future post Muamar Kaddafi era.
We will close the series with an analysis on “doing business” in Libya and
how companies should approach Libya and any expansion there. The series will end
with a telebriefing summarizing our views of Libya, with recommendations on what
policies Western governments should adopt for maximum security, better trade,
and sustainable economic development.  If you wish to be kept informed of these
releases, send us an email here.
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Libya-Europe: Security, Illegal Immigration and Oil and Gas
By Alessandro Bruno
The Megrahi Release, a Gift to Muammar Kaddafi
Libya has always rejected British and American charges that two of its citizens
masterminded the Lockerbie bombing. Colonel Muamar Kaddafi, the country’s
leader, was forced to endure sanctions, because having immediately agreed to
extraditing the two suspects, al-Megrahi and al-Fahimi, would have signaled
political weakness. Moreover, in Libya’s very tribally sensitive political
culture, apart from portraying Kaddafi as having succumbed to western
‘imperialism’ in the yes of Libyan citizens, African and Middle Eastern
leaders, it would have shown tremendous internal weakness also. Both suspects
belong to the al-Magaraha tribe; the very same to which former prime minister
(in pre-Jamahiriya days) and influential aid major Abd as-Salam Jalloud belongs.
Since the late 1980s there were signs of disagreements between Kaddafi and
Jalloud, who represents the more militant and ‘revolutionary’ side, a sort
of Libyan ‘Che Guevara’.
The extradition of the two suspects would have weakened the delicate tribal
balance already under threat. In the mid 1990s, during the period in which Libya
faced UN sanctions, Kaddafi endured one of the worse periods in his tenure with
growing discontent against his role and regime. In the 1995-1996 period, the
Libyan leader was the target of at least three attacks and coup attempts. Oil
prices were low, bringing less money to Libya, and inflation was high. The
Libyans were discontent as the regime allowed a limited degree of private
enterprise, which highlighted social, and economic differences in a country
where everyone was supposed to be equal and where houses “belong to those who
live in them” as stated in the Green Book and countless signs all over the
Libyan landscape.  So much so that Islamic militancy had never been stronger
than in this period in Libya.
Kaddafi is at the Height of Prestige
There was no question then that the release of al-Megrahi, if not his acquittal,
was going to serve as a Libyan political victory to boost Kaddafi’s leadership
and legitimacy (tribal in particular) at home and prestige abroad. It is
difficult to believe, therefore, that British or American officials were
surprised by the boisterous homecoming. In Libyan logic, and even in the logic
of many British citizens, the celebrations were expected and legitimate. The
West has portrayed the celebrations as cynical, insisting on presenting
al-Megrahi as the actual terrorist who brought down Pan Am 103, killing 270
people. Indeed, the United States now has full diplomatic relations with Libya,
as has the United Kingdom and the European Union. None of these is under threat.
A stronger and more legitimate Kaddafi implies a continued stability in the
country, something that the West needs, and by extension the Southern
Mediterranean region as whole. Think of the debacle of ousting Saddam Hussain
and bring that closer to Europe. Libya has, in a sense, become more internally
secure because the leadership has been able to restore the tribal balance, even
the Kaddafi personality does not necessarily match Western views of leadership
style. This makes Libya an even more valuable partner for the West. Kaddafi will
need continued stability if he is also to promulgate his role, or create another
higher institutional role for his son Saif ul-Islam, his likely successor, who
was an important protagonist in the celebrations for the return of al-Magrahi. 
Kaddafi has emerged from the sanctions ten years ago; at no time as today, does
he enjoy more stability, legitimacy – international and domestic – and
prestige than the present.  In a sense, you can imagine him as a more victorious
and a successful Fidel Castro. Not only resilient and a survivor as the Cuban
leader has been, but now thriving in an economy that everyone wants a piece of
the pie. The Libyan leader can appease those who maintain the revolutionary line
of combating ‘western imperialism’ (Kaddafi also received profuse apologies
form the president of Switzerland at the end of August) as well as those who,
conversely, demand better relations and business ties to the West and beyond.
Oil and Migration Control
For many years Kaddafi was set aside and until recently accused of supporting
international terrorism. He started traveling to the West last year when he
visited Madrid and Paris setting up his traditional tent to receive visitors.
Since then Kaddafi has traveled to the Kremlin as well. In June, however,
Kaddafi will make a very important visit, from the symbolic point of view, to
Italy, Libya’s former colonial master. Kaddafi’s visit to Italy will be an
opportunity to discuss bilateral matters, including Libyan investment in
strategic Italian energy, power generation, finance, and even football clubs. It
will also be an opportunity to discuss the issue of illegal migration, which
concerns all of the European Union. Europe wants to curb the flow of Africans
and Asians refugees or would-be-immigrants trying to reach Europe from the
Libyan shore. Although Libya and Italy have already taken steps along these
lines – in May the Libyan navy took delivery of three brand new patrol boats
from an Italian shipyard intended to help the country control its coastline –
boats smuggling migrants continue to reach Italian or Maltese territorial
waters. Last February, the EU agreed to give Libya €20 million to further
improve its patrol units and training, but the Libyan government says this is
not enough to help it stop the flow of migrants.  Libya's interior ministry
asked the EU “to provide additional technical aid, training and equipment”.
The Italian government recently started to adopt a more proactive policy of
intercepting illegal migrant boats before they reach Italian territorial waters,
forcing them to turn around and return to Libya. The policy has met criticism
from international human rights organizations including Amnesty International
and the United Nations because, said the latter, summary interception did not
allow legitimate refugees to make their claim. However, under Italian pressure
Libya has agreed to allow formal accreditation to the small UNHCR office in
Tripoli such that it might manage and evaluate refugee requests directly on
Libyan soil. On June 10, during Kaddafi’s visit, Libyan, Italian and Maltese
delegations are expected to discuss this modality further in what will be one of
the first examples of burden sharing between Africans and Europeans in
controlling the flow of African migrants.
About 90% of the illegal migrants landing on Italian shores leave from Libya. In
2008 alone, some 67,000 people crossed the Mediterranean Sea, half of which
landed on Italian or Maltese shores, said UNHCR. Significantly, the number of
illegal immigrants reaching Italy grew by 75% percent in 2008 over 2007,
suggesting that previous agreements between Libya and the EU on controlling the
migration flow have not worked. Apart from Europe’s strategy to diversify its
energy sources, increasingly for natural gas in view of annual fears of
Russo-Ukrainian gas supply disputes, illegal migration has become one of the
most important drivers of EU-Libyan relations. The Libyan leader, Col. Kaddafi
is very aware of the delicate nature of the issue and its importance to European
electorates. However, Libyan citizens also consider Illegal immigration to be
one of the country’s most urgent problems, attributing perceptions of higher
crimes rates on this phenomenon.
How is Libya Contributing to Migration Issue – is it Doing so Deliberately?
African migration in Libya is made all the more complicated by the fact that
Kaddafi’s turn away from Arab unity to African unity in the mid 1990’s,
meant less restricted movement of Sub-Saharan African migrants to Libya.
Continuing conflicts in the Horn of Africa, southern Nigeria, Chad, Sudan, and
other areas, continue to push many desperate people to take chances in crossing
the desert to reach the Mediterranean and then set off for Europe. This has led
to about two million entering Libya unchallenged. Having made much of his
pan-African ‘dream’ Kaddafi is unlikely to take significant steps to help
control this migratory phenomenon on its southern and desert borders. Moreover,
since becoming the president of the African Union, endorsing the formation of a
“United States of Africa” - a single African entity, which would allow for
the free movement of people and goods within the continent – Kaddafi may find
it difficult to reach a compromise between his ideological pursuits and his
country’s international commitments. For instance, addressing the African
Union in the very days when Libya and the EU appeared to share similar concerns
over illegal migration, the Libyan leader inevitably pandered to African
sensibilities, praising Somali pirates for challenging the looting of their
waters:  "They are not pirates but people who are defending their rights." He
added that the Somali pirates need real help and that Libya “will accuse
several countries of violating the international law if they do not stop their
interference in Somali waters.”
The Libyan government knows that illegal migration gives it a diplomatic
advantage in relations with the EU and it is using this as an advantage to
secure modern military equipment and training. Libya has asked the EU for an
additional USD 1 billion in technical aid and equipment in exchange for more
collaboration with Europe on the illegal immigration front. The urgency of
migration in European political agendas suggests that the EU may not have much
time to ponder whether to agree to the Libyan demands. In exchange for taking
back migrants who leave from its shores, Libya now wants the EU to provide it
with boats, helicopters, trucks and other equipment to help it patrol its
borders and shoreline. The EU said, "Libya has already sent its 'shopping list'
to Brussels, which we estimate will cost us around $1 billion. Although we are
not giving any commitments we will surely be looking at Libya's demands more
favorably once it is showing signs of collaboration."
Idiosyncrasies Remain
While Libya and its leadership have not made any real changes to its
idiosyncratic state system, the ‘Jamahiriya’ (vaguely translated as rule of
the masses) toward achieving the values of democracy to which the West pays so
much lip service. Apart from the oil and gas deals attracting companies from the
United States to China, Libya has become indispensable to the West because of
the growing problem of clandestine migration. Libya is the main country of
departure for sub-Saharan migrants, typically from Sudan, Eritrea, Niger, Mali
or Somalia, heading toward Europe and landing in Malta or in Italy. The oddities
of the Libyan leadership have contributed significantly to this phenomenon. When
Kaddafi started to shift from pan-Arabism to pan-Africanism in the mid 1990s, he
invited thousands of Africans to come to Libya. Many did come and settled in the
outskirts of city centers, forming black market networks of various kinds from
alcohol to narcotics, coming into competition with the local networks.
The African Union under the leadership of Kaddafi appears to be absorbed in the
pipe dream of the ‘United States of Africa’, even as ethnic , religious and
pastoral-farmer (such as in Darfur) conflicts, coups, botched elections abound.
Until Africa and the world make a serious effort, starting from Somalia, to
tackle the problems of governance in Africa, people will inevitably migrate.
Libya’s central position in the Sahara makes it accessible from West and East
Africa; migrants from Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone go through Mali and
Niger and follow the routes toward the southern Libyan towns of Sebha; those
coming from the Horn of Africa arrive to Libya and settle in the Kufra region
before heading toward the Mediterranean shore. Incidentally, both Kufra and
Sebha are near some of Libya’s most prolific oil wells. Libya has become the
nerve centre of African migration and Tripoli is all too aware that this issue
is second only to oil in geo-strategic importance. Libya appears willing to
become a sort of giant internationally sanctioned internment camp to help
contain the phenomenon.
Desperate migrants also head toward Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco in order to set
off on their flight toward the northern shores of the Mediterranean, but these
countries have been more active in securing their borders and Libya has become
the main departure point. Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that while the
Libyan leadership uses migration as advantage to obtain new military equipment
from Europe to help it guard the coastlines and the deserts, the Libyan secret
services (tied to the Revolutionary Committees) and the police are enablers in
the people smuggling business. An Egyptian worker in Benghazi, Sayyid Ibrahim,
claims to have been severely beaten by Libyan secret service agents and expelled
a month after helping uncover a people smuggling operation. Prior to the beating
incident – reported by an Egyptian source in a report, which has also almost
caused a diplomatic incident - the Libyan press had described the man as ‘the
pharaoh who defeated the smugglers”. The EU can do very little to prevent such
trafficking and even if it could be proven and confronted, the Libyan leadership
knows that Europe needs its oil and gas – especially in view of a need to
diversify the gas supply from Russia, which has proven to be less reliable in
the past few years.
Libya and Its Anti-Terrorism Credentials
While it continues to exact diplomatic advantages from the EU over concerns of
clandestine migration, Libya is also intent on improving relations with the
United States. The timing of a statement issued by the Libyan Islamic Fighting
Group (LIFG), a terrorist group said to have links to al-Qaida, in which it
clearly renounces terrorism is oddly propitious.  Libyan ‘Arab Afghans’
(those Arabs who joined the Afghan mujahidin against the Soviets) established
the LIGF in 1995; and part of its charters was the formation of an Islamic state
in Libya. It is said to have received cooperation from the British MI6 to kill
col. Kaddafi in February 1996. The group faces severe bans in Europe, Curiously
in the past few years, the al-Qaida no.2 man, Al-Zawahiri, played up the
LIFG’s role in the organization. The kidnappings of westerners in Niger in the
past few months contributed to give the LIFG, along with other would be al-Qaida
allies in the Maghreb, credibility as a formidable terror force.
The LIFG claimed to have joined Bin Laden in 2007. It was being touted as one of
the leading groups in the al-Qaida network and characters with Libyan names
(i.e. nicknames meaning ‘The Libyan, or al-Libiy’) started to emerge in
investigations of suicide attacks in Afghanistan and Pakistan in 2007. One such
attacks coincided with a visit by Dick Cheney to the Bagram air base), promoting
the group’s credentials as bona fide al-Qaida. The LIFG statement in July
suggests the group has done some deep soul searching, refuting the very tactic
of "indiscriminate bombings" against civilians, adding that these failed to
"achieve the aims of the group in removing oppression". Moreover, also in July,
Libya has exhorted opposition members living in exile to return home; dissidents
could register with Libyan diplomatic missions in their countries of exile, and
arrange their return. Coincidentally, the United States has formally declared
that it is interested in pursuing greater military cooperation with Libya to
curb terrorism said Jeffrey Feltman, acting US assistant secretary of state for
Near Eastern affairs.
The LIFG renunciation of terror may add credibility to Libya’s claims that it
is confronting terrorism effectively, and drawing praise from the USA for it.
One could be forgiven for seeing a bit of a 2003 renunciation of WMD déjà-vu.